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Political Economy of Land Grabbing inside China Involving Foreign Investors 
 
ABSTRACT China tends to be a dominant figure in the literature on global land grabbing. It is 
either cast as a major land grabber in distant places such as Africa, or as a key player in crop booms 
elsewhere because it provides for massive market demand, such as for soya from South America. These 
are all quite important issues and are well covered in the literature. However, the crop booms inside 
China that involve transnational capital and investors—and have provoked conflict around land 
politics—have been overlooked. Spotlighting the issue of land grabbing inside China reminds us that 
capital accumulation is principally interested in geographies and settings where it can generate profit 
– regardless of nationalities, boundaries, structural, or institutional conditions. This paper hopes to 
contribute towards a more refined picture of global land grabbing. 
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Introduction 
China is a highly visible player in the contemporary global land rush, with land-based investments in 
distinct regions around the world, from Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America.1 The literature tends 
to treat such large-scale land acquisitions by Chinese firms as actions dominated, or at least facilitated, 
by the Chinese government as part of its “going out” policy to achieve domestic food security—or to 
put it more directly, to seek “new rice bowls”.2 However, some scholars have pointed out that China’s 
role in land grabbing might be overstated and misunderstood, particularly in Africa.3 In reality, many 
of these projects do not go beyond the stage of official announcements, rather they are suspended or 
terminated due to outright social resistance in the host country or due to various other economic, 
political, or legal issues.  
Meanwhile, China is taking the lead in importing some key agro-products. According to FAO data, 
China was responsible for 63.6 per cent of global soybean exports, and 51 per cent of the world’s oilseed 
trade in 2013.4 For China, agro-products are imported to fulfil the ever-increasing domestic demands 
of its large population—not only for food, but also for feed and fuel, given the flexibility of certain 
crops.5 While, for the main exporting countries/regions (e.g. South America), producing a large quantity 
of given crops for export is usually associated with crop booms and changes in land-use, land control, 
and production mode, which have significant impacts on local population. 6 
In short, the global land grabbing literature largely frames China’s role as either a key 'grabber' or as 
a main site for agro-products consumption—but never as a destination for transnational large-scale land 
deals. Where studies mention land grabs inside China, the research is limited to domestic land 
investors.7 This set of literature misses the fact that there are indeed land deals or grabs inside China 
that involve foreign investors.  
Industrial tree plantations (ITPs) and sugarcane are two of the booming sectors in southern China.8 
In the Guangxi Province, two foreign companies, namely, Stora Enso from Finland and APP from 
Indonesia, have controlled large tracts of land for the development of the ITP sector. By 2015, the ITPs 
owned by these two companies had expanded to some 200,000 hectares (ha) of land (see Table 1) – 
affecting thousands of village households, and provoking widespread conflict among villagers, state 
farms, and the foreign companies. Why China? This is a question for the foreign investors. Why foreign 
land investors? This is a question for the Chinese state and land owners. How did the foreign companies 
gain access to land? This is a question for both sides. To answer these questions, this paper uses the 
Stora Enso and APP cases to analyse the drivers and mechanisms of foreign land investments in 
Guangxi in the ITP sector.9 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The next section 
discusses the key features of contemporary land grabbing; the third section presents and examines 
2 
 
empirical issues in relation to two foreign investors and Chinese policies (why China? Why foreign 
investors?); the fourth section focuses on the land system in China; and based on this, the fifth section 
explores the mechanisms of foreign investors’ land access (how their access to land is gained?).  
Understanding contemporary land grabbing 
Diverse forms of land grabbing appear in the current literature, including ‘green grabbing’ – land 
transactions for environmental ends;10 mining – land grabbing for underground mineral resources;11 
and ‘water grabbing’– land grabbing focused on an area’s water resources. 12  No matter the target, all 
of these land grabs essentially constitute ‘control grabbing’, as defined by Borras et al.: 
Contemporary land grabbing is the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and 
other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve large scale 
capital that often shifts resource use orientation into extractive character…13  
This definition highlights political issue of control of land and land related resources. To understand 
the dynamics of land control, the role of land grabbers and domestic operators in ‘host’ countries should 
both be carefully examined. On the one hand, as dominant players, investors seek to gain control over 
land from others (either the state, the collective, or individuals) and are driven by both global and 
domestic forces, including ‘food security, energy/fuel security, climate change mitigation strategies, 
and demands for natural resources by new centres of capital’.14 Based on their demands and a series of 
corresponding political-social-economic considerations, the investors actively make decisions on 
recipient countries/regions, the scope, and the process of their investment. For example, when a 
capitalist’s land acquisition is for offshore food production, he or she will prioritise those 
countries/regions where the cost of production, reproduction and circulation are relatively low in order 
to benefit from land access. In this sense, analysis of the investors and their motivations is key to 
understanding the dynamics of a land grab. 
On the other hand, as Hall reminds us, ‘actors and structures in recipient states’ should never be 
neglected.15 This is due to the fact that they have a critical role in fostering, facilitating and impeding 
the process of land control. More specifically, original land-use, land ownership and institutional 
settings around land in the recipient countries/regions not only determine which and how much land is 
available for investors, but also indicate how investors are able to gain access to land. Meanwhile, the 
dynamics of state, state policies, and political reactions from below are also (re)shaping the trajectory 
of land grabbing.16 For this reason, the previous land system in China, particularly in Guangxi, and the 
role of the state and the affected villagers will be discussed alongside the analysis of foreign companies’ 
land access, 
Foreign investors and the drivers of foreign land investments in Guangxi 
Stora Enso and APP have received much public attention as main landholdings, although they are not 
the only two existing foreign companies that are involved in land-based investments in China.17 Both 
investors are worldwide paper-pulp giants with large production and sales portfolios. Specifically, Stora 
Enso specialises in producing and global sales of a series of tree-based products, including consumer 
board, packaging solutions, biomaterials, wood products and paper.18 Stora Enso has mills/factories in 
South America (Brazil and Uruguay), the United States, Europe, Russia and Asia (China and Pakistan), 
either through joint ventures or as single owner.19 It owns around 4 million ha of tree plantations in 
Sweden, Finland, Uruguay, Brazil, Estonia, Romania, Latvia, Russia, China and Laos, either through 
purchase or lease. 20  APP is a subsidiary of Sinar Mas Group, and it focuses on pulp and paper 
production targeted at the global market.21 Its production sites are concentrated in Indonesia and China, 
with 9 mills and 2,600,000 ha tree plantations in Indonesia and over 20 mills and 300,000 ha plantations 
in China.22  
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APP and Stora Enso were originally motivated to enter the Chinese market because of the huge 
demands for paper-pulp products in China that were due to the country’s fast urbanisation rate and 
remarkable population growth.23 Later, both companies became involved in the ‘Plantation-Pulp-Paper 
integration’ (Linjiangzhi Yitihua) project. As shown in Table 1, APP started its land investments in 
Guangxi in 1995 and Stora Enso started its land acquisitions in Guangxi in 2002. Both these companies 
have obtained incredibly large tracts of land. As shown in Table 1, the number of ITPs controlled by 
Stora Enso had reached 82.26 thousand ha by 2015, while APP controlled around 100 thousand ha. At 
the same time, the capital involved in their integration projects (including building for pulp mills) is 
extensive, with 12.8 billion Yuan in the Stora Enso case and 40 billion Yuan in the APP case.  
TABLE 1 Two Main Foreign Investors  
Name Nationality of the company 
Starting 
year 
Investment 
(billion Yuan)24 
Scale (1000 ha) 
State land  
Collective-
owned land 
Total area 
 
Stora Enso Finland 2002 12.8 53.18 33.08 86.26 
APP Indonesia 1995 40.0 0 106.67 106.67 
Source: Stora Enso’s Annual Report 2015; and Liu Yang. 2016. APP Guangxi Plantation-Pulp-Paper 
Integration Project, 2010, accessed on 7 July 2016, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/67730/12680269.html. 
Motivations of foreign companies 
Why did these two paper-pulp companies choose to invest in the land-based ITP sector in China? 
Although the staff of both companies claimed that the ITP sector is not profitable,25 in practice, their 
investments can reap benefits in at least three ways. First, constructing human-made forests is 
championed as reforestation, which is used by the investors as a strategic response to public criticism 
on their negative environmental impacts. Second, as paper-pulp corporations, direct control over the 
ITP sector can secure their sufficient and stable supply of raw materials. Third, because of the multiple 
end uses of the outputs, control over the outputs can bring additional profits.  
 (1)A response to public criticism  
Paper-pulp companies have always been criticised by the public worldwide, including China, for their 
extractive activities and for polluting the environment. Japan’s Oji Paper Company was opposed by a 
large-scale protest in China's Qidong city in 2012 for its planned water discharge project. 26 APP itself 
was criticised and opposed by GreenPeace and other NGOs for illegal logging and destruction of natural 
forests in Indonesia and in the Yunnan and Hainan provinces of China.27 
To respond to these criticisms, APP and Stora Enso coincidentally use the same discourse of building 
tree plantations: 
‘Use our paper, we plant more trees’--APP logo28  
‘Plant trees and forests to benefit nature, make pulp and paper to benefit people’--APP-China29 
‘The forest and forestry industry are part of the solution to the climate problem’ -- Stora Enso30  
These clearly show that both companies intended to claim that the tree plantation programme is a 
testament to their social responsibility commitments, and that such activity is eco-friendly rather than 
extractive. According to this carefully constructed business logic, the promotion of ITPs not only 
reduces the use of nature, but also repairs it.Thus, foreign land investments can be viewed as an adapted 
version of ‘green grabbing’: on one side, ‘moral weight of a discursively-constructed global green 
agenda legitimises the appropriation of land and resources’;31 and on the other, the touted ‘green’ land-
based investments, in turn, legitimise the accumulation of investors in the host country. However, as I 
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witnessed in the field, affected villagers roundly criticise ITPs as having significant negative 
environmental impacts due to the sector’s high demand for water and nutrition. 
(2)Control of raw material 
Meanwhile, for these paper-pulp companies, control over ITPs also means control over the raw 
materials of their products. As explained by an employee of one foreign company: 
If a pulp plant has been built up, (the supply of raw materials from our existing ITPs) will not 
be enough. (We will) need more (trees) at that time. The original plan was to build over 2 
million mu (ITPs in Guangxi). 32  Now it seems to be very difficult (to realise). Even if we 
want to purchase (the trees), it will still depend on whether others (who own the trees) want 
to sell. Then the price will become very high.33     
This implies that the land-based investments might not be aimed at extracting profits directly from 
the ITP sector. Instead, they are aimed at gaining control over raw materials for paper/paperboard 
production. As White et al. summarised: ‘the purpose of the great majority of corporate land grabs is to 
establish agricultural production (or other forms of extraction such as mining) on a large scale, and to 
guarantee access to its products.’ 34 
As shown in Figure 1, China's imported volume of pulp has been increasing since 1980, and reached 
about 16 million tonnes in 2013, accounting for a large part of the total pulp consumed domestically.35 
The increasing dependence upon pulp imports shows a great demand for raw materials of paper-pulp 
production, namely, wood chips made from trees. 
 
FIGURE 1 Chinese import volumes of pulp for paper (1000 tonnes) 
Source: FAOSTAT, accessed on 23rd February 2015, http://faostat3.fao.org/download/F/FO/E 
 
The increasingly wide gap between demand and supply of pulp implies a potential surge in the value 
of ITPs,36 which can be denoted by a rapid increase in the price of eucalyptus trees from 200 Yuan per 
m3 in 2000 to 850 Yuan per m3 in 2015.37   
Therefore, for these international paper-pulp companies, while investments in the ITP sector might 
not be profitable in the short run, expansion of the value chain can secure the stable supply of raw 
materials, which will reduce cost and unpredictable risks in the long run.  
(3)Additional gains from multiple uses of the ITP sector 
Moreover, control of ITPs can bring additional economic gains because only small branches are usually 
consumed during paper production. It was observed that both of the foreign investors sell eucalyptus 
tree trunks, especially those with diameters over 8 cm, to timber processing mills for the production of 
wood-based panels, which have recently become more profitable due to a huge domestic market demand 
caused by the rise of real estate sector. According to one villager who was hired by APP to transport 
eucalyptus trees, APP sells part of their timber products this way: ‘big ones are carried to Wuming (a 
timber processing industrial park in Wuming County of Guangxi); small ones are peeled and transported 
to the factory in Qinzhou.’38 Similarly, Stora Enso also sells their wide girthed timbers publicly on a 
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Chinese online platform.39Although there is no data available to assess whether benefits of such sales 
have reduced or even surpassed the cost of these companies’ land-based investments, selling surplus 
outputs indicates that the control of ITPs provides opportunities for investors to maximise their profits 
through simultaneous and selective benefit from the multiple uses of eucalyptus trees. Furthermore, this 
implies possible flexing use of the crop, which enables the investors to reduce risk and uncertainty in 
volatile markets.40 
In short, the three main reasons for foreign companies' land investment in China are to gain social 
legitimacy, to access raw materials, and to control multiple uses. The first two points are related to the 
maintenance of their profitable paper-pulp business in China, and the last one is to extract as much as 
profit as they can. So, it is clear that the original and essential driver is profit, as is the case with other 
investments by capitalists. However, motivation alone is not enough for foreign investors to be able to 
enter China and access land. Why does the Chinese government allow these foreign investors to enter 
China and gain control over land? To answer this question, it is vital to explore the role of the Chinese 
state in attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). 
Attracting foreign direct investments: the role of the state from central to local level 
 At the central level, as part of the ‘reform and opening-up’ (Gaige Kaifang) , intertwined with the 
“going out” policy, ‘bringing in’ (yin jinlai) strategy was introduced in the late 1970s. Under the 1979 
Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, FDIs were initially legalised in special 
economic zones. In the 1980s and 1990s, foreign investments in China were officially promoted when 
foreign enterprises were granted management autonomy, tax incentives and some other benefits by an 
array of laws and policies.41 After China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, a series 
of long-run geographic restrictions was removed, leading to the Chinese market’s further opening-up 
to foreign investors.42  
Echoing central policy, the provincial government of Guangxi also laid out policies to encourage 
FDIs. According to these policies, foreign investors, especially those engaged in sectors encouraged by 
the government (including forestry), are entitled to further tax relief and priority in accessing 
information, loans and other resources. 43  Thus foreign corporations as Stora Enso and APP are 
legitimised and encouraged to invest in Guangxi.  
However, whether or not foreign corporations can gain access to land is more directly linked with 
the role of local governments. This is due to the fact that under the decentralisation system, local 
governments, especially those at the county and township levels, have been granted the power to 
reallocate resources, such as land and subsidised fertilizers.44  
At the local level, county and township governments tend to attract FDIs to generate revenues, 
especially after ‘policy converted local states into financially independent entities that had the 
unprecedented right to dispose of the revenue they retained.’ 45  Such tendencies were further 
strengthened when the revenues obtained by the local governments were significantly reduced after the 
introduction of ‘Tax for fee’ reform in 2002.  
Meanwhile, local governments always use land as a key instrument to attract FDIs. According to Wu 
and Heerink, sizable rural land areas have been expropriated to host foreign investors since 1998, mainly 
for the construction of industrial parks.46 This falls in line with the demand for land access of foreign 
companies such as Stora Enso and APP. 
To summarise, the state, especially at the local level, is motivated to bring in FDIs with a set of 
preferential policies, including subsidies, tax reduction, and facilitation of land access. However, to 
realise foreign land-based investments, certain mechanisms are required to change control over rural 
land in China, with emphasis on previous land-use and land property rights prior to transactions.  
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Land system in Guangxi 
As shown in Table 1, most of Stora Enso’s controlled land (99.94 per cent) is forestland, with 51.38 
thousand ha (62 per cent) owned by the state and 33.08 thousand ha (38 per cent) controlled by 
collectives (property rights). While for APP, all of its ITPs in Guangxi are built on collective-owned 
forestland.47 
In Guangxi, state forest farms own 10 per cent of the forestland, while the remaining 90 per cent is 
owned collectively (see Table 2). State-owned forestland and collective-owned forestland have different 
trajectories of land use and land control. 
TABLE 2 Property rights of forestland in Guangxi (in 2010) 
 Types Area 
(10000 
ha) 
Percentage 
 State 
owned 
148,88 9,28% 
Collective 
owned 
1456,11 90,72% 
Total 1604,99 100,00% 
Source: author elaboration from 12th Five-year Plan of the Development of Eucalyptus in Guangxi 
(2010-2015)  
State-owned forestland was originally allotted from communes to build state-owned forest farms in 
the 1950s and 1960s. As the forestland in Southern China is mainly for commercial use, according to 
the national plan,48 forestland plots were mainly used to plant acacia trees and pine trees before the rise 
of eucalyptus trees in the 2000s, ‘to fulfil the huge domestic demand for timber’.49 Collective-owned 
forestland tells a different story. The land use for most of the forestland was originally ‘waste’ or 
‘underused’. Specifically, from 1950s-1970s, large areas of forestland were destroyed for food 
production. Those less hilly and rocky forestland plots (around 700,000 ha) were used for grain and 
sugarcane cultivation, leaving other non-arable forestland plots as ‘waste’. 50 Later, even under state-
led reforestation movements,51 these forestland plots mostly remained degraded with several pine trees 
and/or acacia trees planted haphazardly. 
The degradation of collective-owned forestland resulted mainly from the low economic incentives of 
forestland investment and villagers’ shortage of financial capital. At the same time, pine and acacia 
trees have low and slow economic returns because of their long growth cycle (more than 15 years). 
Consequently, before the rise of eucalyptus trees, there were very few economic incentives that made 
it possible for villagers to invest in forestland. On the other hand, villagers’ economic status impeded 
their ventures. As explained by one of the villagers in Guangxi, ‘in the past, we were very poor here. 
We did not have money to plant (trees). What can we do? When bosses came, (is it possible) that we 
did not (let them) to develop? (We) contracted the mountain, all the mountains were contracted to 
them.’52 
However, this does not imply that these ‘waste’ forestland plots were not used by villagers. In one 
village I visited where Stora Enso and APP acquired large-scale collective-owned forestland, many 
villagers told me that they used to ‘live on cutting firewood’. 53  It implies that these land-based 
investments tend to have significant impact on villagers’ livelihoods.  
With regard to land property rights, the ownership of collective-owned forestland is rather 
ambiguous. 54  In the 1980s, when farmland was equally contracted to rural households under the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) reform, most of the collective-owned forestland in Guangxi, 
especially those ‘waste’ land plots, remained at the hand of collectives.  
While, in practice, these undistributed forestland plots had been customarily ‘owned’ by a few 
villagers. In most villages, it is commonly agreed that ‘those who clear empty land (forestland), own 
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the land’.55 In other words, once someone in the village reclaimed a piece of forestland, this land plot 
is then believed to be ‘owned’ by his/her household. These households usually possessed rich labour 
resources, extra money for the venture, and sometimes, even special social networks for better 
information access (e.g. village leaders or their relatives and friends). 
To formally distribute and clarify the user rights of collective forestland, Guangxi started forestland 
reform in 2008, 56 although most of the land plots were already being used or occupied by several 
internal villagers and external investors before the reform. 
So, the social relations around the land that was later transferred to foreign investors are complex: 
some are state owned; some are owned collectively but already customarily “owned” by someone; some 
are for commercial use; some are ‘waste’/‘underused’ but actually used by someone. This implies that 
foreign companies required particular strategies to gain control over land.  
Mechanisms of land access 
First, Chinese law stipulates that since APP and Store Enso are foreign investors, the companies are 
required to set up joint ventures involving domestic capital in order to gain access to land in China. As 
a result, 12 per cent of Stora Enso Guangxi's shares are held by two state-owned entities (Guangxi 
Forestry Group Co Ltd and Beihai Forestry Investment and Development Company).57  
Additionally, according to the Land Administration Law of the PRC, no one can buy or sell land. 
Thus, in order to acquire land, these two international companies have to lease from, or cooperate with, 
landowners. Under the land system in Guangxi, APP and Stora Enso have four main channels to gain 
control over land, namely, 1) leasing land from state-owned farms; 2) leasing land from rural collectives; 
3) leasing land from middlemen; and 4) cooperating with individuals. 
Leasing from state-owned farms 
As key projects to attract state-promoted FDIs, the two foreign companies were offered an opportunity 
to contract forestland owned by state-owned farms through Guangxi Forestry Group, a company set up 
by the Guangxi Forest Department.58 
Through this channel, more than 60% of Stora Enso’s forestland was transferred from 8 state-owned 
forest farms. Also, APP was permitted to contract 44.67 thousand ha forestland from 5 state-owned 
farms. 59 But due to the unfavourable geographic conditions of the land, APP is not going to not settle 
the transaction.60  
Foreign companies prefer to use this channel because land that is owned by state-owned farms is 
usually large-scale and contiguous—and with less complicated social relations. These features mean 
that the land acquisitions operating within this channel are more convenient and have fewer potential 
conflicts.  
However, this channel is not entirely conflict free. Some state-owned farms expressed complaints: 
The 50-year duration for land lease is too long. Our land leased from outside only has a term 
of 30 years… When Stora Enso leased the forestland, the price was only few hundred Yuan 
per mu including the price of seedlings. Now the benefits are seven or eight times (more). 
(The benefit) could be over 10 thousand Yuan per mu. It (Stora Enso) does not to want (to 
lease) the land with any conflicts. The land lease is the requirement from the government. It 
(the investment of Stora Enso) is the investment introduced by the provincial 
government. ….If (we) can (choose) not to lease the land to Stora Enso, (we) certainly are 
not willing to give (the land) to them. 61 
Meanwhile, change of land control results in a land shortage of state-owned farms as they have leased 
out large-scale forestland. Consequentially, these state-owned farms also started to contract land from 
outside (mainly from rural collectives) in order to compensate for their land loss. 
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Leasing from rural collectives 
Apart from leasing forestland from state-owned farms, another vital approach is to lease land from 
collectives through negotiations with village leaders/elites. Similar to the previous channel, such land 
leases are not without state intervention. A village cadre from a county in Guangxi illustrated this well: 
‘in the past, the government helped to build connection (between the foreign companies and the 
village)’.62 
This is also a favourable option for foreign investors to hold, because collective-owned forestland is 
relatively contiguous. However, as previously mentioned, before the entrance of Stora Enso and APP, 
collective-owned forestland might already be used and/or customarily occupied by a few villagers. 
Hence, due to such ambiguous ownership of forestland, foreign companies’ land access tends to 
provoke conflicts. 63 
 Two other key triggers for conflicts via this channel are the illegally signed agreements and the low 
land rent, in addition to land ownership. The illegal land contracts might be due to the manipulation of 
a few local elites, as observed by Ping and Nielsen,64 or the carelessness of the villagers, as pointed out 
by an employee of a foreign company.65  In some cases, these leases could lead to loss of collective 
land without compensation, and even without the villagers noticing, which provoked conflicts. 66 
However, in a few cases, because of the illegality that took place during the signing of land contracts, 
the villagers were rightfully able to have support in getting higher land rent or in getting some land back, 
as was the case in one village I visited in Guangxi. Land rent is always low, far below the current value 
of forestland that has increased due to the rise of the ITP sector. According to an official from the 
Guangxi Forestry Department, forestland rent has increased more than 10 times in Guangxi from the 
time that land leasing started—so  “there are huge conflicts” 67. 
After these land leases, the villagers in question lost their control over the forestland they should have 
priority to contract68. Thus, except for those who have the financial capital to lease land from other 
villages, most villagers lost a possible opportunity to expand their livelihoods with the rise of the ITP 
sector. As a village leader in Guangxi explained with regret, ‘at that time, (we) did not know (the price) 
of the tree is so high. If (we) knew, (we) would distribute the forestland to each household to plant trees 
by ourselves’.69 
Leasing from middlemen 
Before foreign companies entered Guangxi, part of the forestland had already been contracted to several 
individuals (both local villagers and investors from outside) based on the social relations and financial 
capital they possessed.70 So, to get access to those land plots, foreign companies needed to subcontract 
the land from intermediaries  (known as ‘big boss’ by villagers).  
Such land access is not free from state intervention, as an official from a county explained: 
I used to contract some forestland. Because I work in the government, the county 
(government) mobilised (the officials to take the lead to lease forestland under reforestation 
movement). Some friends and I together contracted around 4000 mu forestland. Now all (of 
the forestland) have been given to them (the foreign companies). It is really a loss. But (it is) 
mobilised (by the government)… every county governmnet has tasks (related to the quantity 
of land leased to the foreign companies). 71 
However, this is a less preferred channel for corporations. Although foreign companies can access 
large-scale land areas with fewer contacts through intermediaries, the land rent is usually higher 
compared to direct leasing. As an employee of one foreign company complained: 
We want (to get the land from the collective). But we have our plans, and we have some 
norms. We are surely slower and less flexible than those individuals. They (the individuals) 
are very fast. They get a lot of land from collectives. (Negotiating with individuals) is not 
what we want… we have no way. ...They contract from villagers, (with the land rent) at 10, 
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50 or 100 Yuan per mu. While, we contracted with them (at the price) from100 to 150 Yuan 
per mu.72 
In addition, investors are disconnected from original land holders/users when acquiring land via this 
channel. This tends to increase potential conflicts with the affected villagers, especially when the 
middlemen obtained land through improper means (e.g. coercion) as illustrated by Ping and Nielsen.73 
Cooperating with individuals 
When the landholders, usually the big ones (called ‘Da hu’ by villagers), are not willing to lease their 
land to international companies, the foreign companies (mainly APP), chose to cooperate with these 
landholders in some cases: landowners plant eucalyptus trees using seedlings, chemical inputs and 
technologies offered by foreign companies, and the profits are negotiated and divided. 74 
Again, this is not a channel that is independent of state involvement. According to a report from 
Economy & Nation Weekly, the government of Qinzhou City used to require the forestry department of 
each county to facilitae APP’s land access. Following the call, an official in the forestry department of 
Pubei County (a county of Qinzhou City) represented APP during the signing of cooperation agreements 
with villagers in the name of the forest department of Pubei County.75 
This is the least favourable channel for corporations. With such an approach, foreign corporations do 
not gain direct control of the land, and take more risks (e.g. crop failures or ‘side selling’ problems).76 
Moreover, such land access has provoked a myriad of conflicts with villagers. In the case of Pubei 
County mentioned above, some villagers had not received any payment after two rounds of logging. So 
those villagers turned down APP’s further logging attempts.77 
Besides the four main channels illustrated above, there are a few other means that Stora Enso and 
APP use to acquire land (e.g. taking over plantations from individual planters 78 and leasing land from 
small landholders). But these are less common and usually occur at a much smaller scale.  
However, such change in land control is not static or linear. In practice, some forestland plots are 
subcontracted by foreign companies to other domestic investors due to frequent typhoons, arson and 
tree theft. (For example, the ITPs owned by APP in one village of Guangxi were sub-leased to a Chinese 
entrepreneur, according to my interviews in March 2016.) Meanwhile, some forestland was returned to 
rural collectives or villagers as a response to related conflicts with affected villagers. To understand 
these dynamics of land control, the role of the state and of affected villagers in (re)shaping the trajectory 
of land grabbing should be highlighted. 
Generally, foreign companies’ land access in Guangxi is more or less facilitated by state actors 
(especially at the local level): part of their forestland is directly leased from state-owned forest farms; 
some land plots are subcontracted from officials, their relatives and friends by mobilisation of the state; 
and some land contracts with rural collectives/individual landholders are based on social networks 
brokered by local governments. However, such is not the case in all counties across Guangxi. Some 
county governments are not so enthusiastic, especially when there is no direct revenue generation. 79 
Within such changes in land control, villagers are not simply victims. Some of them were 
incorporated under different terms: a few villagers became land brokers and facilitated foreign 
companies’ land access; other villagers directly transferred their land holdings to foreign companies in 
exchange for land rent (via leasing) or partial profits under agreements(via cooperation); and yet some 
other affected villagers are employed by foreign companies to work in ITPs, although those jobs are 
usually temporal and seasonal. In this sense, the actions of these villagers essentially promoted the land 
acquisitions of foreign land investors.  
Nevertheless, in the instances where villagers embraced these land investments, some are resisting 
with tactics including litigation, arson, sabotage, and land encroachment. These conflicts have triggered 
outcomes ranging from unpaid/underpaid land rent to negative environmental impacts of ITPs.80 The 
resistance, in turn, has a role in (re)shaping foreign land acquisitions. 
10 
 
Faced with resistance from below, both APP and Stora Enso have become cautious about their land 
access strategies in Guangxi. APP has nearly halted its land acquisition in Guangxi since 2008.81 Stora 
Enso reduced the amount of land it controls from 90.2 ha in 2014 to 86.3 ha in 2016, after having started 
correcting and revising its land leasing contracts in 2009.82 
Moreover, in response to the resistance, the provincial government began putting brakes on the rapid 
and massive expansion of eucalyptus tree plantations.83 Some county governments in Guangxi even 
issued policies to stop planting eucalyptus trees and have plans to completely remove the ITPs,84 which 
will inevitably affect further expansion of the foreign companies’ ITPs.  
Conclusion 
Foreign companies have indeed gained control over land inside China. Corporations’ land investments 
are driven by the profits that they are able to obtain in China either directly from the ITP sector or from 
its downstream pulp-paper sector. Such companies have been able to acquire land from state-owned 
farms, rural collectives, and landholders, and are facilitated by domestic actors, including both state 
actors and a few villagers. 
This paper shows an alternative geographic trajectory of global land grabbing by linking these 
findings to the global land rush: China, which is cast as either a major land grabber in distant places, or 
as a key context for crop booms elsewhere, can likewise be a host country for large-scale foreign land 
investments. Land grabs can take place in any region, even in a traditional ‘grabber’ country like China, 
as long as profits are available for capitalists. This insight is also echoed in van der Ploeg, Franco and 
Borras’s work on land grabbing within the Europe Union and Borras et al’s research on crop booms in 
China. 85 As Karl Marx argued: ‘[t]he restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he 
(capitalist) aims at.’86 The logic of capitalism is to maximise profit. Thus, investors will go wherever 
they can profit, whether at home or abroad, through whatever channel they can use to gain control over 
land. 
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of flexing soybeans.", and Alonso-Fradejas et al, "Inquiring into the political economy.". 
6 Borras and Franco, “Global Land Grabbing”; and Hall, “Land grabs, land control”.  
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7 See Siciliano, “ Rural-Urban Migration ”. 
8 In this paper, different from the definitions of others (e.g. Overbeek, Kroger and Gerber), ITPs refer 
to monocultures of fast-growing tree crops mainly used for inedible industrial raw materials, including 
eucalyptus, pine, and acacia trees. Among these, eucalyptus trees have become the most popular in 
Guangxi, and are thus the main focus in my study. 
9 The study is based on both the primary data collected from author’s four fieldwork trips in Guangxi 
in spring 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 and the documents from government and company. 
10 See Fairhead et al, “Green Grabbing” 
11 Seagle, “Inverting the impacts”. 
12 Mehtaet al, :Introduction to the Special Issue”, 193. 
13 Borras et al, ”Land grabbing in Latin America “,851. 
14 Ibid, p 851. 
15 Hall, “Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession”,1589. 
16 Wolford et al., “Governing Global Land Deals”; and Borras and Franco, “Global Land Grabbing”. 
17 Sino-Forest from Cananda and OJI PAPER CO., LTD from Japan also acquired land in Guangxi, 
but in a much smaller scale and receive much less public attention. 
18 StoraEnso,” Progress Book”, 24. 
19 Ibid, p 5. 
20 StoraEnso, “Sustainability Report”, 49. 
21 APP website, accessed on 21st June 2016, https://www.asiapulppaper.com/about-app. 
22  See APP-China, “ Sustainability Report 2014”, 7, 30; and APP. 2015. “APP Sustainability Report 
2014”, 12-14,47 
23 Field notes, 20th and 21st March 2014. 
24 Yuan is Chinese currency. 1 Yuan equals to 0.14 USD. 
25 Field notes, 19th March 2015; See Tongxin “The Real Exploration” 
26 Accessed on 24th June 2016, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/japans-oji-paper-resumes-
output-at-china-plant/article/feed/2017721  
27Green Peace webpage, accessed on 24th June 2016, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/china/zh/campaigns/forests/work/work-achivements/app-records/.  
28APP website, accessed on 20th June 2016, https://www.asiapulppaper.com/ .  
29APP-China Website, accessed on 20th June 2016,  http://www.app.com.cn/en/about/info/id/123  
30 StoraEnso, “Progress Book”, 11 
31 Fairhead et al “Green Grabbing”, 251. 
32 Mu is a unit for the measurement of land. 15 mu equals 1 hectare. 
33 Field notes 19th March 2015. 
34 White et al, “The new enclosures”, 621. 
35 The percentage is 47% calculated with FAO data, but the number is ‘80%’ according the interview 
with an employee from one foreign company (Field notes, 21st March 2014). 
36 However, Yan et al observed an opposite trend of land-use change in the soybean sector in China. 
With huge demands on grain and increased soybean imports, the domestic soybean production has 
experienced dramatic decline due s series of global and domestic politics.(Yan et al. “China's soybean 
crisis”) 
37 Field notes, 27th March 2015. But such implication is not one-way. The rise of the ITP sector, in 
turn, had some (if not a profound) impact on the supply and demand of ITPs, which is encapsulated in 
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the price decrease of eucalyptus trees in 2016 (to around 400 Yuan per m3) (Field notes, 19th March 
2016).  
38 Field notes, 20th March 2016. 
39 Beibu Gulf Equity Exchange Group, accessed on 27th June 2016, 
http://www.bbwcq.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&keywords=%CB%B9%B5%C0%C
0%AD%B6%F7%CB%F7&no=&catid=19&city=%CB%F9%D3%D0%B5%D8%B5%E3&hy=%CB
%F9%D3%D0%D0%D0%D2%B5&submit=%B2%E9%D1%AF. 
40 For more analysis on flexing crops, see Borras et al. "The rise of flex crops ". 
41 For example, the 1986Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment and the 1991Income Tax Law for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
42 Yueh, "China’s Going Out".  
43 The 1996 Guangxi policy on further opening up, accessed on 8th January 2018, 
http://www.dxgxcpa.com/e-news/dispArticle.Asp?ID=61; the 2003 Guangxi preferential tax policy 
for foreign investors, accessed on 8th January 2018, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/g/200403/20040300192586.shtml. 
44 Rozelle, "Decision-making in China's ". 
45 So, "Peasant conflict", 565. 
46 Wu and Heerink, “Foreign direct investment” 
47 Collective-owned land is the land owned by rural collectives. It is the land that all of the villagers in 
the community can commonly use. 
48 ‘北休、西治、东扩和南用’ (People’s Daily Online, accessed on 30th June 2016, 
http://people.com.cn/GB/paper85/15907/1406021.html) 
49 The staff from Guangxi Forestry Department, Field notes, 4th March 2015. 
50  Li, “Dynamic studies”, 27. 
51 one in 1990s aiming at recovering waste forestland and another in 2000s to return forestland occupied 
for food production. 
52 Field notes, 20th March 2015. 
53 Field notes, 3rd March 2016. 
54 As mentioned by Ho and Spoor, without a clear assignment of property rights and with the state’s 
ultimate control, Chinese land system is proven to be secure and successful. 
55 Field notes, 6th March 2015. 
56 From central government website, accessed on 22nd April 2016,  http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-
10/29/content_2252860.htm  
57 StoraEnso, Sustainability Report, 17. 
58 After the reform of public institutions in China, ‘Guangxi Forestry Group has unhooked from the 
Guangxi Forest Department and belongs to State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council now’ (Field notes, 4th March 2015). 
59 Accessed on 1st July 2016, http://www.gxlyjt.com/news/shownews.php?lang=cn&id=164. 
60 According to an employee of APP, these forestland plots are located in the east and north of Guangxi, 
far away from their pulp factory in Qinzhou and in a climate unsuitable for planting eucalyptus trees, 
Field notes, 20th March 2014. 
61 Field notes, 10th March 2015. 
62 Field notes 18th March 2015. 
63 As the case I interviewed in one village in Guangxi (Field notes, 4th March 2016), it led to the return 
of land from a foreign investor later. 
64 Li and Nielsen. “A Case Study on”, 18-19. 
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65 According to the employee, “In the past, villagers do not know eucalyptus trees, and do not know 
how many economic benefits (can be gained from) this tree crop…they thought forestland is valueless. 
So, when signing agreements, many of them did not care. A lot of people were not at home. Some called 
phones and said: ‘anyway, I did not use that thing (forestland), you just forest it.’ Some asked other 
villagers to sign their names. .. (Some agreements) do not have enough signatures.” (Field notes, 19th 
March 2015) 
66 Li and Nielsen. “A Case Study” 
67 Zhang, “Eucalyptus Trees Enclosure”. 
68 According to Law of the People's Republic of China on the Contracting of Rural Land, villagers 
have priorities to contract the collective-owned land from their collectives. 
69 Field notes, 2nd March 2016. 
70 Most of large-scale land owners I interviewed are either local elites or the relatives/friends of the 
local elites during my fieldwork in 2015 and 2016. 
71 Field notes, 17th March 2015. 
72 Field notes, 19th March 2015. 
73 Li and Nielsen, “A Case Study”. 
74 For example, 30% for villagers and 70% for the company, according to official of local forestry 
department, the employees of the foreign companies, individual entrepreneurs and villagers (Field 
notes, 17th and 19th March, 13th April 2015 and 3rd March 2016). 
75 Zhang, “Eucalyptus Trees Enclosure”. 
76 It refers to the phenomenon that individuals do not sell products to contracted companies, but 
another who can give a higher price. It is quite common in rural China as also observed by Zhang, 
“The Political Economy” 
77 Zhang,“Eucalyptus Trees Enclosure”  
78 As the case I interviewed on 20th March 2015, a villager contracted the 10s mu of forestland to 
Stora Enso for 30 years together with eucalyptus trees already cultivated due to the poor road 
condition in his village. 
79 Only in the counties where the big paper-pulp company or processing factories/mills are built, the 
governments can get tax, as planting eucalyptus trees per se is not taxed. 
80 For more analysis on villager’s political reactions to ITPs in Guangxi, see Xu, “Politics of 
inclusion”. 
81 See Tongxin, “The Real Exploration”  
82 An official reply from Stora Enso online, accessed on 25th April 2016, 
http://www.beihai365.com/bbs/m/iphonetest/read.php?tid=3443840&onlylz=1; and Sustainability 
Report. In Stora Enso’s Annual Report 2015, 47. 
83 As the central state will require the provincial government to deal with the conflicts. 
84Web news, accessed on 29th April 2016, http://news.sohu.com/20060411/n242749631.shtml, 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/2014/0815/264952.shtml. 
85 van der Ploeg, Franco and Borras, “Land concentration and land grabbing”; Borras et al, “Land 
control and crop booms” 
86 Marx, 1992. Capital: Vol. 1,107. 
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